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ROBERT BORK’S FORGOTTEN ROLE IN THE
TRANSACTION COST REVOLUTION
ALAN J. MEESE*
The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of
industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This
revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation
of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea
change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the
Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.
This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution.
It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that
revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official
onset of the transaction cost revolution, Bork helped rediscover Ronald
Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm,1 and employed Coase’s reason-
ing to offer TCE justifications for various forms of partial integration. Bork
explained how exclusive territories, customer restrictions, and horizontal min-
imum price fixing that accompanied otherwise valid joint ventures were vol-
untary efforts to overcome the social costs of reliance on atomistic markets. In
so doing, Bork articulated and applied numerous tools of TCE, tools that re-
flected departures from the then-dominant applied price theory version of in-
dustrial organization.
* Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary Law
School. The William and Mary Law School provided a summer research grant in support of this
project. The author thanks Matt Sawchak and Adam Di Vincenzo for very helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
1 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937) [hereinafter Coase,
Nature of the Firm].
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I. APPLIED PRICE THEORY AND THE INHOSPITALITY
TRADITION
Robert Bork graduated from law school in 1953 and published his first
article on antitrust law soon thereafter.2 At the time, much antitrust doctrine,
including the doctrine governing various forms of partial integration,3 re-
flected what would later be known as the “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust:
an instinctive hostility to business conduct other than moment-by-moment ri-
valry in the spot market.4 For instance, courts frowned on tying contracts be-
cause they prevented “competition on the merits”—that is, head-to-head
rivalry for sales based solely on a product’s price and attributes—without pro-
ducing any apparent redeeming virtues.5
Some have attributed this hostility to judicial rejection of economics.6 In
fact, however, the inhospitality tradition reflected a straightforward applica-
tion of the then-contemporary teachings of industrial organization, the subset
of economic theory addressed to the behavior of firms and the performance of
the industries in which they participate. While nominally a separate economic
discipline, industrial organization during this period was little more than “ap-
plied price-theory.”7 Price theory, in turn, examined the impact of markets on
2 See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954).
3 In this article, the term “partial integration” refers to contractual coordination of the eco-
nomic activities of otherwise independent units, not including outright cartels. See Alan J.
Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 55–56 (2004); see
also Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion—Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 384 n.29 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Price Fixing and Market
Division II] (adopting similar definition of “contractual integration”). By contrast, this article
will employ the term “complete integration” to refer to coordination of economic activities
within a single firm. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 82 (1975) (defin-
ing (complete) vertical integration as “placing technologically separable production units under
common direction”).
4 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 19 (1985)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (describing the inhospitality tradition of an-
titrust); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 715
(1982) (same); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 124 n.245 [hereinafter Meese, Rule of Reason] (collecting authorities that
refer to the inhospitality tradition).
5 See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 127–28 (describing judicial hostility to tying
contracts during this era).
6 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 927,
928 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Analysis] (claiming that mainstream antitrust analysis
ignored price theory during this era).
7 R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 ECONOMIC RESEARCH:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 59, 62 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) [hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization]. In
support of this assertion, Coase cited leading texts on industrial organization. See id. at 61–62.
Each cited text described then-contemporary industrial organization as applied price theory. See
JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 25–27 (1959) (describing the critical role of price the-
ory as the foundation of industrial organization); RICHARD E. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY:
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the allocation of resources and thus on society’s economic welfare.8 Price the-
ory began with the foundational model of perfect competition,9 but it also
sought to ascertain the allocative impact of less competitive market structures,
including monopoly, oligopoly, and “monopolistic competition.”10
While price theory sought to explain the “performance of business firms in
the selling markets for the goods they produce,”11 it offered no explicit expla-
nation for why firms—the most prevalent form of economic integration—
exist at all.12 Indeed, the most rigorous models of perfect competition began
with the individual, not the firm, as the unit of analysis, even on the produc-
tion side.13 Given these models’ other assumptions, including perfect informa-
tion and the absence of movement costs, the firm itself served no apparent
purpose that individuals could not achieve by means of repeated transactions
on the (costless) spot market.14 Still, perhaps because firms were ubiquitous in
the real world, some economists imposed the firm by fiat as the fundamental
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 14 (1967) (stating that “the subject of industrial organiza-
tion applies the economist’s models of price theory to the industries in the world around us”);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 1 (1968) (portraying industrial organiza-
tion as applied “price or resource allocation theory”).
8 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 56–57 (1921) (defining “freedom”
as “free competitive relations” based on private property; equating “freedom” and “free competi-
tive relations” with perfect competition); A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 127–30 (4th
ed. 1932) (describing the goal of work as determining whether the “free play of self-interest” and
resulting simple competition will result in wealth-maximizing allocation of resources); see also
TIBOR SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 8 (1951) (“In particular, [this book] shall ana-
lyze . . . the efficiency and equity of the economic organization which results from the indepen-
dent production decisions of private firms whose behavior is co-ordinated by the market
mechanism.”).
9 See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 76–93 (detailing assumptions and operation of the model
of perfect competition).
10 See BAIN, supra note 7, at 114–24 (analyzing oligopoly); EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN,
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1965) (analyzing monopolistic competi-
tion); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 195–97 (3d ed. 1966) (analyzing monopoly).
11 BAIN, supra note 7, at 25 (emphasis added).
12 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714
(1992) [hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure] (“[M]ost resources in a modern economic sys-
tem are employed within firms . . . .”). Some did seek to explain why firms existed. See, e.g.,
KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 264–312 (contending that the firm can arise in response to uncertainty).
13 Knight, for instance, defined perfect competition as requiring that each individual act “in
entire independence of all other persons” and that “[e]xchange of finished goods [be] the only
form of relation between individuals.” KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 78. This definition necessarily
excluded any firm-employee relationship.
14 Id. at 81–93 (describing operation of perfect competition in this manner); see also Harold
Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 426, 426 (1997) (“Neoclassical theory’s objective is to understand price-guided, not man-
agement-guided, resource allocation.”); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 143 (1988) (“‘Firm’ in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical device
adopted to facilitate discussion of the price system.”).
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unit of production and distribution in their model of perfect competition, with-
out deriving the firm’s existence from antecedent premises.15
While price theory lacked any explanation for firms’ existence, it did pur-
port to explain why extant firms choose to perform additional tasks them-
selves, that is, to vertically integrate into supply, production, or distribution.
In particular, price theorists identified two possible motives for vertical inte-
gration: one harmful and one beneficial.16 On the harmful side, economists
said, vertical integration could help create or protect market power, by, for
instance, foreclosing rivals from access to inputs.17 The beneficial motive, it
was said, was the creation of technological efficiencies by bringing previously
separate portions of the production process under the same roof.18 At the same
time, some price theorists argued that these efficiencies could arise only at the
plant level and thus could not explain integration into distribution.19 As a re-
sult, price theorists often speculated that the monopoly explanation was more
prevalent than the technological explanation, albeit without any empirical sup-
port.20 In any event, in the absence of a technological explanation, price theo-
15 See, e.g., SCITOVSKY, supra note 8, at 109–13 (describing the role of firms in the economy);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICE 21 (1942) (describing the firm and the
household as economic units); Scott Moss, The History of the Theory of the Firm from Marshall
to Robinson and Chamberlin: The Source of Positivism in Economics, 51 ECONOMICA 307,
310–11 (1984) (concluding that Alfred Marshall derived his theory of the firm inductively, by
examining real-world enterprises).
Under this methodological approach, “the firm” merely reflected the modeling assumption that
producers maximize profits by choosing inputs and setting output in light of their technologically
determined production functions, as well as prices in input and output markets. See R.H. COASE,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 3 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, FIRM, MARKET, AND LAW]
(“The firm to an economist . . . ‘is effectively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and
the theory [of the firm] is simply the logic of optimal pricing and input combination.’” (quoting
Martin Slater, Foreword to EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM vii, ix
(2d ed. 1980))); see also SCITOVSKY, supra note 8, at 113–21 (discussing the role of production
functions in analyzing “firm” behavior); STIGLER, supra, at 109–10 (explaining how technology
determines the content of production functions). The “theory of the firm” offered predictions of
how this fictional unit would behave under particular conditions, all with a view toward ascer-
taining the efficiency consequences of resulting choices. See Kenneth E. Boulding, The Theory
of the Firm in the Last Ten Years, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 791, 791 (1942).
16 See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 69–71
(1st ed. 1970) (identifying two rationales for vertical integration).
17 Id. at 70 (“Firms integrated vertically may keep raw materials out of rival hands, or fore-
close markets to rivals, or establish a vertical price structure . . . squeez[ing] profit margins of the
less integrated competitor.”).
18 Price theory’s quintessential example of technologically induced vertical integration was
the integration of iron and steel production to achieve cost savings. See Alan J. Meese, Refram-
ing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Rea-
son Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 488 n.173 (2010) [hereinafter Meese, Reframing Antitrust]
(collecting numerous texts from this era employing this example).
19 E.g., BAIN, supra note 7, at 381.
20 Id.; George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1942)
(“[I]t is arguable that most of the important advantages of vertical integration partake of a mo-
nopolistic nature.”).
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rists understandably inferred that observed vertical integration had market
power origins.21
Price theorists’ view that only technology could explain beneficial vertical
integration caused suspicion of complete integration, but downright hostility
to partial integration pursuant to nonstandard agreements.22 Such agreements
did more than simply mediate the transfer of title from one firm to another on
the spot market; they exercised control over trading partners before or after a
sale by, for instance, designating where a dealer could sell or from whom it
could buy.23 Technological efficiencies inevitably arose within the boundaries
of a firm, during the production process.24 In contrast, nonstandard agreements
inevitably reached beyond firm boundaries, influencing the conduct of suppli-
ers before they provided inputs to the firm or influencing the conduct of cus-
tomers after they purchased a finished product.25 In either case, such
agreements cannot produce technological efficiencies.26 Thus, price theorists
inferred that nonstandard agreements, which limited rivalry and caused other
departures from perfect competition, had market power origins.27
For three decades or so, antitrust policy reflected this applied price theory
approach to industrial organization.28 Throughout this period, courts and en-
forcement agencies grew increasingly hostile to complete and partial integra-
tion, as exemplified by Donald Turner and Richard Posner’s 1966 attack on
21 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Integration, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTION-
ARY OF ECONOMICS 807, 809 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 1987) [hereinafter Williamson,
Vertical Integration] (stating that according to applied price theory, “the evident or proximate
cause for vertical integration that does not have . . . a ‘physical or technical aspect’ is
monopoly”).
22 Id. at 809 (“The applied price theory conception of firm and market structure . . . confi-
dently advises public policy to adopt very stringent limits on vertical mergers and forbids vertical
contractual restraints.”); see also id. at 807–08 (“Since, moreover, vertical integration and the
use of vertical market restrictions are closely linked . . . skepticism toward vertical integration
was deepened and took the form of hostility [toward] contractual restrictions . . . .”).
23 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 23 (distinguishing “classical
market exchange, whereby product is sold at a uniform price to all comers without restriction,”
from nonstandard contracts).
24 See id. at 370–71 (hostility toward nonstandard contracts “was buttressed by the view that
true economies take a technological form [and] hence are fully realized within firms”).
25 For instance, vertical exclusive territories would control the disposition of products even
after title passed to a dealer.
26 See Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Per-
fect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 21, 43–45 (2005) [herein-
after Meese, Non-Standard Contracting].
27 Id.; Williamson, Vertical Integration, supra note 21, at 808–09; see also CARL KAYSEN &
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 8 (1959) (contending that departures from perfect com-
petition necessarily reflected an exercise of market power).
28 See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 124–34.
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Schwinn’s nonprice vertical restraints.29 This hostility peaked in 1969, when
the Supreme Court declared maximum resale price maintenance (RPM) un-
lawful per se.30 This ruling had the effect of protecting dealers’ margins at
consumers’ expense unless manufacturers integrated forward and took on the
task of distribution themselves—a step that might itself have been considered
unlawful.31 Before 1969 the Court had banned, as unlawful per se or nearly so,
tying, exclusive dealing and quasi-exclusive dealing, exclusive territories,
customer restrictions, and, of course, minimum RPM.32 Price theorists praised
these results, with some admonishing the Court to ban even more practices.33
II. THE TRANSACTION COST REVOLUTION:
THE DOMINANT ACCOUNT
Just as the applied price theory tradition achieved its greatest influence, a
scientific revolution occurred in the form of transaction cost economics, radi-
cally altering industrial organization’s account of vertical integration.34 The
traditional account of this revolution runs as follows.35 Even before price-the-
29 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 183–85 (describing brief
coauthored by Donald Turner and Richard Posner in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)); see also Brief for the United States at 29–51, Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (No. 25) (contend-
ing that Schwinn’s nonprice restraints reduced price competition without producing any offset-
ting virtues).
30 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153–54 (1969), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
31 See id. at 152–53; see also, e.g., Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437
F.2d 1336, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1970) (condemning forward integration and above-cost prices that
excluded prior distributors).
32 See Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969) (banning tying contracts
obtained by firms with economic power); id. at 503–04 (holding that the ability to obtain a tying
contract itself gave rise to an inference of economic power); Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382 (banning
exclusive territories and customer restrictions as unlawful per se); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 320–21 (1966) (holding that quasi-exclusive-dealing contracts offended “the central
policy of . . . the Sherman Act” by depriving dealers of the ability to purchase and resell products
“in an open market”); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (holding a
“coercive type of ‘consignment’ agreement illegal under antitrust laws” and reconfirming the per
se ban on minimum RPM); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–07
(1949) (condemning an exclusive-dealing contract that governed only seven percent of the mar-
ket’s dealers); see also Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 553, 562–63 & n.38 (2004) [hereinafter Meese, Intrabrand Restraints] (listing the au-
thorities cited above).
33 See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Mo-
tor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1968) (contending that nonprice restraints
accomplished via consignment should be unlawful per se, contrary to Schwinn).
34 See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1986) [hereinafter
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust] (concluding that TCE’s reconceived account of vertical inte-
gration involved a “genuine scientific revolution”).
35 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 46–49 (4th ed. 2011) (rely-
ing upon traditional account); Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Com-
petition Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 12–14, 15–16 (2003) (summarizing Coase’s
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oretic industrial organization produced the inhospitality tradition, Ronald
Coase offered a theory of the firm that was unrelated to technology or market
power.36 Coase began by recognizing that, in perfect competition, individuals
can conduct economic activity via market contracting, rendering firms super-
fluous.37 He then found the presumptive rationale for the firm, and for vertical
integration generally, in a slight departure from perfect competition, namely,
the costs of employing market transactions to conduct economic activity.38
Coase identified two such costs: (1) identifying relevant prices and (2) negoti-
ating agreements for relevant transactions.39 According to Coase, the firm is a
special type of contract that replaces the constant contracting imagined by
perfect competition. In the firm, a factor of production, labor, agrees to follow
the instructions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.40 By contracting for
such hierarchical direction, Coase said, economic actors can eliminate trans-
action costs.41 At the same time, Coase also recognized that conducting eco-
nomic activity via a firm produces its own costs, because coordination of the
institution’s activities by a single owner becomes increasingly costly as firms
expand.42 Individuals adopt this particular arrangement, Coase said, when the
alternative, reliance on market contracting, is more expensive than reliance on
a firm.43
As the story goes, even though Coase’s insight was published before World
War II, it lay dormant, exercising no influence, until the 1970s. According to
Coase, “The article continued to be cited in footnotes in the 1960s, although
without any noticeable effect on what was written in the text, so that in
[1972], I felt justified in referring to my article as ‘much cited and little
criticisms of what Muris calls neoclassical economic theory, then discussing the emergence of
TCE as building on Coase’s insights); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 134–41 (describ-
ing traditional account). But cf. Meese, Non-Standard Contracting, supra note 26, at 47–54 (sup-
plementing traditional account).
36 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 1; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 673, 686 (2010) [hereinafter
Williamson, Natural Progression] (describing Coase’s work as initiating an “informal stage of
transaction cost economics” in which “errors or omissions in the neoclassical set-up were
described”).
37 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 1, at 388 (“[H]aving regard to the fact that if
production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organi-
sation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?”).
38 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 1, at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable
to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”).
39 Id. at 390–91; see also id. at 390 n.4 (“[I]t is one of the assumptions of static theory [i.e.,
perfect competition] that ‘[a]ll relevant prices are known to all individuals.’ But this is clearly
not true of the real world.” (paraphrasing Nicholas Kaldor, A Classificatory Note on the Determi-
nateness of Equilibrium, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 123 (1934) (alteration in Coase article))).
40 Id. at 391.
41 Id. at 390–92.
42 Id. at 394–96.
43 Id. at 394–98.
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used.’”44 Oliver Williamson, too, has stated that Coase’s insight went unno-
ticed “for the next thirty-five years.”45 Indeed, in his Nobel Lecture, William-
son opined that although Coase did “informal” work in the 1930s, “preformal
work got under way in the 1970s,” including work “reinterpreting [complete]
vertical integration” and “vertical market restrictions.”46
In the early 1970s, the story continues, some economists, including Wil-
liamson, rediscovered Coase’s explanation for the existence of firms and thus
for complete vertical integration.47 Moreover, these same economists began to
“operationalize” Coase’s theory, identifying attributes of transactions that
would influence transaction costs. Most importantly, Williamson and others
identified specific investments, that is, investments that are most useful in
connection with a particular economic relationship, as sources of potential
opportunism and thus costs of relying on market transactions to conduct eco-
44 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 23 (1988) [herein-
after Coase, Meaning] (quoting Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 7, at 63); see also
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 35 (1988) (recounting
Coase’s “grim assessment” of the article’s influence in 1972).
45 Williamson, Vertical Integration, supra note 21, at 808 (“Although this [TCE] conception
of the firm-as-governance-structure was first advanced fifty years ago (Coase, 1937), it lacked
operationality and languished for most of the next thirty-five years (Coase, 1972). The past fif-
teen years [1972–1987], by contrast, have witnessed renewed attention to and operational head-
way on transaction cost matters.”). Despite Williamson’s qualified phrasing (“for most of the
next thirty-five years”), he did not identify any pre-1972 references to Coase’s 1937 article. For
example, he did not mention, perhaps out of modesty, that he himself began to call attention to
Coase’s work in 1971. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 112, 112 (1971) [hereinafter
Williamson, Market Failure Considerations] (describing Coase’s 1937 articles as one of “[t]he
two principal prior contributions on which the [technological interdependency] argument re-
lies”); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. POL.
ECON. 123, 124 (1967) (stating that Coase’s 1937 article “generally supports” the position that
“problems of coordination imposed a static limitation to firm size”). Nor did he cite Coase’s
1960 article The Problem of Social Cost. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost].
46 Williamson, Natural Progression, supra note 36, at 686.
47 See Robert Gibbons, Transaction-Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future?, 112 SCAN-
DINAVIAN J. ECON. 263, 265 (2010) (concluding that “key writings from the 1970s . . . ex-
press[ed] the core theoretical ideas of TCE”); Lukasz Hardt, The History of Transaction Cost
Economics and Its Recent Developments, 2 ERASMUS J. PHIL. & ECON. 29, 30 (2009) (“[TCE]
has a long past but as a science it has a short history. That history began in the 1970s with the
work of Oliver Williamson.”); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERN-
ANCE ix (1996) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE]  (“My first concerted
effort to study the economics of organization from a comparative institutional perspective in
which economizing was featured and the analytical action was concentrated in the details of
contracting was in my [1971] paper, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations. That approach turned out to have considerable generality and led to follow-on
research. In combination with other, related papers, what has come to be known as transaction
cost economics began to take shape.”).
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nomic activity.48 After revitalizing and improving Coase’s explanation for
complete integration, it is said, economists identified transaction cost explana-
tions for partial integration.49 A “revolution” in economists’ understanding of
nonstandard contracts occurred, manifesting itself in a presumption that re-
straints that accomplished partial economic integration were efficient methods
of reducing transaction costs.50 Simultaneously, courts and the enforcement
agencies reversed antitrust policy’s hostility to these restraints. More pre-
cisely, in an extended series of decisions that began with Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,51 the Supreme Court jettisoned per se rules against
various nonstandard agreements, in favor of rule-of-reason scrutiny.52 Indeed,
Williamson himself explicitly cited Sylvania as an example of transaction cost
reasoning, albeit as only a first step.53
This account of the TCE revolution does not mention Robert Bork. To be
sure, Williamson cited Bork’s work.54 However, Williamson apparently had
48 See Williamson, Natural Progression, supra note 36, at 678–87; Williamson, Market Fail-
ure Considerations, supra note 45, at 116; Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropri-
able Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
49 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: An Overview, in THE ELGAR COM-
PANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 8, 19 (Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta eds.,
2010) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics] (“TCE focuses on specific phe-
nomena, of which vertical integration (the make-or-buy decision) is the paradigm problem. This
choice . . . expressly addresses the puzzle to which Coase . . . referred [in 1937] . . . .”); William-
son, Vertical Integration, supra note 21, at 808 (explaining that during the applied price theory
era, “[a] different assessment of vertical integration and vertical restraints awaited an alternative
conception of the firm”); see also Muris, supra note 35, at 15 (“TCE builds on the insights of
Coase’s classic 1937 article on the firm  and shifts the analysis toward exchange relationships.”).
50 Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 34, at 274 (“[I]deas matter more in antitrust
than in most regulated areas. As one observer noted, ‘[a] genuine scientific revolution has oc-
curred . . . [and] has led to a more thoughtful and rational approach to antitrust.’” (quoting H.E.
Frech III, Comments on Antitrust Issues, 7 ADVANCES HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVS. RES.
263, 264 (1987))); see WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 28 (articulating
“the rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes”).
51 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (applying rule-of-reason analysis to nonprice vertical restraints that
controlled dealers’ actions after passage of title), overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
52 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007) (applying
rule-of-reason analysis to minimum RPM), overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (applying rule-of-reason
treatment to maximum RPM), overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Bus.
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (limiting the former per se rule
against minimum RPM to “agreement[s] on the price or price levels”).
53 See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications
of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 954, 959 n.29, 975 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions]; see also Carl Shapiro, A Tribute to Oliver Wil-
liamson: Antitrust Economics, 52 CAL. MGMT. REV. 138, 143 (2010) (explaining how
Williamson employed Sylvania to reiterate assertions that TCE offered superior explanations for
vertical restrictions).
54 Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 53, at 961–62 & nn.36–43. While
Williamson focused mainly on Bork’s views on exclusionary agreements, he was also “per-
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not noticed that Bork, in 1966–1968, identified transaction cost explanations
for various horizontal and vertical restraints.55 Nor have any other important
contributors to TCE, including Coase, Cheung, Klein, Demsetz, and Al-
chian.56 During the same period, Williamson, for instance, cited Lester
Telser’s 1960 work,57 which contended that minimum RPM could induce opti-
mal promotion, as an early exemplar of transaction cost reasoning.58
From the traditional account summarized above, modern readers might in-
fer that Bork played no role in the transaction cost revolution that had such a
profound effect on antitrust law. Indeed, a 2010 article by Herbert
Hovenkamp expressly asserts that TCE played no role in Bork’s thinking.59
For instance, Hovenkamp contends that Bork’s writing, particularly The Anti-
suaded by Bork’s arguments that territorial and customer restraints should not be proscribed.” Id.
at 965 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
330–44 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX] ). The pages in The Antitrust Paradox
that Williamson cited related to boycotts and not vertical restraints, however, so it is unclear
which of Bork’s arguments Williamson was discussing. See id. (citing BORK, ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX, supra, at 330–44); see also, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at
99 (citing Bork’s rejection of the leverage hypothesis); id. at 366, 368, 369, 376 (citing Bork’s
views on predatory pricing).
55 Bork’s most important work in this regard is his 1966 article The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division—Part II. See Bork, Price Fixing and Market
Division II, supra note 3. A search of Google Scholar and HeinOnline, along with a review of
several books and book chapters published by Williamson, reveals only one article by William-
son that cites this work by Bork. See Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits
of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 106, 106 & n.3, 110, 114 & n.18 (1969)
(citing Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 390). Williamson cited this
portion of Bork’s article to highlight Bork’s views on conduct that both exercises market power
and creates efficiencies. See id. at 110. Williamson did not address Bork’s argument that partial
integration produces significant benefits.
56 A search of articles by Coase, Cheung, Klein, Demsetz and Alchian in the JSTOR and
HeinOnline databases reveals only one citation of Bork’s 1966 work on nonstandard agreements.
See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 462 n.64 (2009). While Klein refers to this work for its “seminal” argument
that manufacturers seek to increase retailer margins to encourage retailers to provide additional
services, id., he does not mention Coase, Williamson, or “transaction costs,” or otherwise con-
nect Bork’s article to the transaction cost revolution.
57 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
58 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 185 n.22 (describing Telser’s
1960 article, supra note 57, as TCE reasoning in the “public domain” during the 1960s); id. at
186 n.22 (agreeing that minimum RPM can reduce free riding); see also Oliver E. Williamson,
Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 369, 383 n.6 (2005)
(“Despite references by Chicagoans to ‘price theory,’ Chicago’s approach to vertical restraints
has never rested upon . . . price theory. Instead, the Chicago approach to vertical restraints is an
application of [ . . . TCE reasoning]” (quoting Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Re-
straints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 203 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Price
Theory and Vertical Restraints])). Williamson does not mention Bork as one of the Chicagoans
in question; he refers instead to Richard Posner.
59 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust
Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 623 (2010).
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trust Paradox, does not cite Coase.60 Hovenkamp also maintains that “Bork’s
chapter on vertical restraints and RPM says almost nothing about transaction
costs and makes very brief mention of free-rider problems.”61 Instead,
Hovenkamp says, Bork relied on other arguments, particularly the “single mo-
nopoly profit” theory, to rebut arguments that nonstandard agreements could
create or extend monopoly power.62
Hovenkamp contrasts Bork’s supposed silence on TCE with Telser’s argu-
ment that minimum RPM can counter failure in the market for distributional
services.63 Even though Telser did not cite Coase, Hovenkamp tells us,
Telser’s argument was “a form of transaction cost analysis” because his essay
“is about the costs of alternative mechanisms for provision of retailer ser-
vices.”64 Williamson, Hovenkamp tells us, recognized Telser’s arguments as
an application of TCE.65
In sum, the dominant account of the TCE revolution ignores any role for
Bork, while admitting some role for Telser.
III. BORK’S UNHERALDED ROLE IN THE TRANSACTION
COST REVOLUTION
The above account of Bork’s role in the TCE revolution is incomplete. Far
from standing on the sidelines, Bork was an important participant in this
revolution.
Even before Williamson rediscovered Coase’s work in 1971, Bork himself
invoked Coase to support a sustained argument, reflecting TCE logic, that
various forms of partial integration serve nontechnological efficiency pur-
poses. Indeed, Bork may have been the first author who simultaneously of-
60 Id.
61 Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 631 (“[A]s noted above, free riding—a transaction cost
explanation—plays a very minor role in Bork’s analysis of RPM. The free rider explanation . . .
gives a benign accounting of a practice that is prima facie suspicious. But Bork never got to that
second point. Rather, he tried to show that, however much power a firm had to begin with, it
could not get more by RPM.”).
62 Id. at 623 (“For Bork, monopoly is what it is [and] cannot be expanded contractually . . . .”).
63 Id. at 622–23; see Telser, supra note 57, at 87, 90.
64 Hovenkamp, supra note 59, at 622 (“For example, Telser concluded that a firm would
choose self-distribution or distribution through independent agents depending on the relative
costs of doing so. Further, he argued, in the absence of RPM retailers would offer differing levels
of service depending on their own individual cost and demand functions. The manufacturer
might try to use contract provisions to require optimal dealer services, but monitoring and en-
forcement costs would make these unattractive.”). These arguments, according to Hovenkamp,
were “distinctively transaction cost arguments.” Id.
65 Id. at 622–23 (citing Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 53, at 959 n.26,
983 & n.101); see also Meese, Non-Standard Contracting, supra note 26, at 52–54 (characteriz-
ing Telser’s work as early TCE analysis).
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fered transaction cost explanations for partial integration and cited Coase’s
The Nature of the Firm to support his argument.
A. BORK’S REVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF NONSTANDARD CONTRACTS
The conventional account would be largely correct if Bork’s magnum opus,
The Antitrust Paradox, exhausted Bork’s work on partial integration. How-
ever, over a decade before The Antitrust Paradox, Bork offered a systematic
argument about the appropriate treatment of various nonstandard contracts.
This argument spanned three different articles,66 although Bork had written on
the same and closely related subjects even before that.67
The first and longest of these works was The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division—Part II.68 This article was the
second part of a project in which Bork sought to develop a comprehensive
framework for evaluating restraints challenged under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.69 In particular, the article sought to ascertain the appropriate method
for distinguishing between restraints properly condemned as unlawful per se
and those instead subject to rule of reason analysis.70 The article focused sig-
nificant attention on restraints with which courts were currently grappling,
including vertically imposed exclusive territories,71 vertically imposed cus-
tomer restrictions,72 and horizontal allocations of territories and price fixing
related to otherwise legitimate joint ventures.73
66 Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950
(1968) [hereinafter Bork, RPM]; Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3; Robert
H. Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731 (1967).
67 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Control of Sales, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 225 (1962); Robert H.
Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. PROC. 211 (1959).
68 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3.
69 The first part of this project appeared in 1965. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and
the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
70 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 377 (describing “doctrinal
chaos” resulting from “judicial and scholarly fondness for impossibly broad statements of the per
se rule”); see also id. at 384–87 (articulating Bork’s rationale for a per se rule under Section 1).
71 See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 858–59 (6th Cir. 1964) (rejecting the FTC’s
condemnation of exclusive territories); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 837 (7th Cir.
1962) (same); Stanley D. Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 254, 265 & n.54 (1960) (collecting consent decrees banning vertically imposed
exclusive territories).
72 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (declining to condemn
vertical customer restrictions absent more knowledge about the “economic and business stuff”
motivating these restraints).
73 For example, Bork cited a pending case as an example of “horizontal contract integration[ ]
accompanied by ancillary restraints.” Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at
392; see also United States v. Serta Assocs., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (the decision in
that case); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,258, at 81,107 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
6, 1964) (declaring horizontal price fixing ancillary to a joint venture unlawful per se); Denison
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Bork’s article is an intellectual tour de force that bears reading or rereading
by anyone interested in antitrust law or policy. The article begins by reiterat-
ing Bork’s prior conclusion that the “exclusive concern” of antitrust law is
“with the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction,”74 or what
Bork also called “consumer welfare.”75 Bork then endeavored to construct “a
coherent analytical structure to translate [these] values [i.e., maximization of
consumer welfare] into conclusions” when courts analyze forms of price fix-
ing and market division that arise “in widely varying business contexts,” both
horizontal and vertical.76 He rejected the contention that antitrust should con-
demn every contract that reduced or eliminated “competition,” which he de-
fined as “rivalry” between two or more firms.77 According to Bork, “the
inescapable fact is that an agreement which eliminates competition is basic to
almost every productive unit consisting of more than a single person.”78 As a
result, Bork said, many agreements both reduce competition and simultane-
ously increase efficiency, enhancing the allocation of resources and consumer
welfare.79
Criticizing what he called “doctrinal chaos” in Sherman Act case law, Bork
proposed that courts develop improved rules for distinguishing between dif-
ferent categories of restraints.80 He located the foundation for this analytical
structure in the distinction, first drawn by William Howard Taft for Sherman
Act purposes, between naked and ancillary restraints.81 Unlike Taft, who bor-
rowed the list of ancillary restraints from the common law, however,82 Bork
asserted that the line between naked agreements and ancillary restraints turned
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962) (rejecting private chal-
lenge to horizontal exclusive territories that were ancillary to a joint venture).
74 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 375; accord Robert H. Bork,
The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 242, 243–44, 251 (1967);
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7, 13
(1966).
75 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 376–77 (contending that anti-
trust’s exclusive goal should be maximizing “consumer welfare”); see also Arnold C. Harberger,
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 77, 82, 84 (1954)
(employing the term “consumer welfare” several times to refer to total economic welfare).
76 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 376.
77 Id. at 377 & n.5; see id. at 377–80.
78 Id. at 377; see also id. at 380 (stating that condemnation of all “explicit horizontal elimina-
tions of competition” would “seem improper”).
79 See id. at 381.
80 Id. at 377; see id. at 377–78 (describing the Supreme Court’s confusing articulation of the
per se rule and advocating reform).
81 See id. at 380 (discussing Taft’s inclusion of “the agreement of partners not to compete as
one of five ancillary restraints of trade lawful at common law” in United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
82 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281.
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on the probable impact of a restraint on “consumer welfare.”83 This probable
impact, in turn, depended on the relationship, if any, between the restraint and
otherwise legitimate economic activity.84 Thus, a restraint was ancillary within
Bork’s taxonomy if its proponents could identify distinct and valid “integra-
tion” that the challenged restraint could make more “efficient” or “effec-
tive.”85 Such valid integrations included partnerships as well as joint ventures
and other forms of partial integration—what Bork called “contract integra-
tion.”86 “Contract integration,” in turn, consisted of “any coordination
of [otherwise independent economic actors’] business activities” that could
produce efficiencies.87 Such “contract integration” included, for instance, co-
ordination between several firms (e.g., a joint venture), between a manufac-
turer and several independent dealers, or between several members of a
partnership.88
Cartel agreements simpliciter were naked and not ancillary under this ap-
proach, because there was no underlying valid integration that these agree-
ments could make more effective.89 At the other end of the spectrum, certain
restraints that accompanied the formation of a partnership could make such
integration more effective and thus were ancillary.90 Because of their effi-
ciency-creating potential, Bork said, ancillary restraints, although themselves
“loose combinations” (forms of partial integration), were properly subject to
the same standard as transactions creating “close-knit combinations” (forms
of complete integration), such as mergers.91 Continuing the analogy to merg-
83 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 378, 384; see also id. at 378
(“The solution may be found by defining the [per se] rule in terms of consumer welfare.”).
84 Id. at 382–84.
85 Id. at 381–82, 383 n.25, 384 & n.29.
86 Id. at 381–82 (discussing partnerships); id. at 432–34 (discussing restraints ancillary to joint
ventures).
87 Id. at 384 n.29 (“The term ‘contract integration’ . . . refers to any coordination of the
business activities of otherwise independent units. The term is thus as broad as the area of busi-
ness contracts. The sole exception to this usage is that ‘cartels’ . . . are not considered contract
integrations.”); see also id. at 474 (defining “contract integration” as “the coordination of other
productive or distributive efforts of the parties”).
88 Id. at 383, 450 & n.154 (discussing research joint venture); id. at 381–83 (discussing part-
nership); id. at 385 (referring to partnership as “contractual integration”); see also id. at 383 &
n.25 (describing the distinction between a “loose combination” (partial integration, which Bork
called contract integration) and a “close-knit combination” (complete integration, which Bork
called ownership integration)); id. at 432–34 (discussing other joint ventures to which restraints
could be ancillary).
89 Id. at 383 (“[I]f competitors agree to divide markets and do nothing else, it is plain that
there is no integration which is being made more effective. The result, if the agreement has any
effect whatever, can only be the restriction of output.”).
90 Id. at 380–83.
91 Id. at 384 (“Once the category of visibly naked restraints is set aside as per se illegal, the
category of ancillary agreements is seen to be the same economic phenomenon as the category of
mergers or close-knit combinations. Their difference is merely one of legal form: the difference
between integration accomplished by contract and integration accomplished by ownership. Since
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ers, Bork opined that ancillary restraints should be lawful unless plaintiffs
could establish that the parties possessed market power and thus the ability to
reduce consumer welfare.92 In the absence of market power, Bork said, courts
could rightly presume that ancillary restraints produced benefits the possibil-
ity of which would prevent per se condemnation.93 Where, on the other hand,
the parties did possess a high market share, courts should condemn the re-
straint without further analysis, because courts lacked the capacity to ascertain
whether harms or benefits predominated.94
Bork then applied his basic framework to various restraints, beginning with
agreements by partners “not to compete with the partnership.”95 Bork framed
the question as follows:
Why should the Sherman Act permit, in addition [to initial formation of the
partnership], an agreement by the partners not to compete with the partner-
ship? It might appear that leaving the individual partners free to take busi-
ness for the firm or individually would best determine in which instances
integration is the more efficient mode of operation and in which disintegra-
tion is.96
Bork noted that, where such a partnership lacked market power, one could
infer that restraints on partners’ competitive activities produced efficiency
benefits.97 Nonetheless, Bork thought it “desirable . . . to frame a general the-
ory of the ways in which market division and price fixing may create effi-
ciency in order to buttress the argument.”98 Bork found such a theory: these
restraints could solve “what may be called the ‘free ride’ problem” by pre-
cluding individual partners from “appropriating to themselves as individuals
the contributions of other partners.”99 Preventing this misappropriation, in
turn, would preserve and enhance the incentives of each partner to make vari-
ous contributions to the joint enterprise, including “specialized knowledge and
competence, unique business methods, [and] customer contacts,” as well as
choices to specialize in particular fields of practice that complement those of
the Sherman Act attempts to look beyond legal form to economic substance, ancillary restraints
and mergers should be treated similarly.”); see also id. at 384 n.29 (“The relevant distinction for
the Sherman Act, given its economic orientation, is not between ownership and contract but
between integration and cartels.”).
92 Id. at 384–85; see also id. at 387 n.34.
93 Id. at 385.
94 Id. at 389–90 & n.40.
95 Id. at 380.
96 Id. at 381.
97 Id. (In the absence of market power, “the partners must think a general agreement against
competition with the firm is most conducive to efficient operation. They could have no other
motive for making the arrangement.”).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 382.
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other partners and thus enhance the overall marketability of the enterprise.100
Absent restraints on partners’ competitive conduct, Bork said, the firm would
experience a “decay of efficiencies” “in that the efficiencies of combination or
integration will be less completely realized than they otherwise might have
been.”101 Given their efficiency-creating potential, Bork said, these types of
horizontal restrictions on competition were ancillary.102
Having derived the general principle from the partnership example, Bork
then evaluated whether more controversial restraints could produce similar
benefits and thus qualify as ancillary. Bork began by explaining how horizon-
tal market division and price fixing could reduce output, increase prices, and
thereby reduce consumer welfare, but only if the parties to the restraints pos-
sessed market power.103 When it came to vertical restraints, however, Bork
previewed arguments he would later make in The Antitrust Paradox, namely,
that vertical price fixing, exclusive territories, and reservations of customers
could never increase a manufacturer’s market power and thus could not injure
consumers, regardless of the manufacturers’ or the dealers’ market share.104
Because these restraints could never produce harm, Bork said, they necessa-
rily produced efficiencies and thus were necessarily ancillary.105 Moreover,
unlike other ancillary restraints, which should be unlawful if the parties pos-
sessed market power, vertical restraints should, Bork said, be lawful without
regard to the parties’ market position.106
Bork also went on to identify various efficiencies that both horizontal and
vertical market division and price fixing might generate. Bork began with
nonprice restraints, particularly exclusive territories and reservations of cus-
tomers—restraints that the Justice Department, led by Donald Turner and
Richard Posner, was attacking at the time in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
100 Id.
101 Id. Bork offered the following example:
If business comes to one partner because of a reputation [gained within the partner-
ship] and he takes it for his individual profit, he has taken a free ride upon the sacrifice
of the other partners in leaving that line of specialization to him and in helping to make
his ability known. . . . [T]o the extent that the other partners suspect that such parasiti-
cal behavior is occurring they will be less willing to leave areas of specialization to
each other and less willing to advertise each other’s merits to the community.
Id. at 381.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 391–97.
104 Id. at 403 (“In the case of an individual manufacturer’s imposition of restraints upon com-
petition among its resellers, therefore, the manufacturer’s motive can never be restriction of
output. An alternative explanation for the manufacturer’s behavior is necessary, and the only
satisfactory alternative hypothesis is that the manufacturer believes the restraint will increase its
net revenue by increasing distributive efficiency.”).
105 Id. at 404 (“The ability of all truly vertical restraints to enhance the efficiency of the inte-
gration has been demonstrated by the argument that they can serve no other function.”).
106 Id. at 397–405.
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& Co.107 Oliver Williamson, too, objected to the Turner/Posner hostility to-
ward these restraints, but he admits that he had no “alternative story” explain-
ing such restraints at the time.108 Bork, however, had such a story. He
expressly articulated what Williamson and others would later recognize as a
quintessential transaction cost argument, claiming that nonprice vertical re-
straints could overcome the “free ride” problem and thus ensure an optimal
amount of “local sales effort” by a manufacturer’s dealers.109 Absent these
restraints, Bork said, dealers would decline to invest in sales effort, fearing
that they could not capture the benefits—increased sales—that their effort
would generate.110 While Bork analogized this sort of “free ride” to the one he
had identified when evaluating restraints ancillary to a partnership,111 he also
invoked similar arguments by Lester Telser, and Ward Bowman before him,
that minimum RPM could prevent the “free ride” problem or the “spilling-
over effect.”112 Moreover, unlike Bowman and Telser, who had confined their
arguments to vertical restraints, Bork explained how, for instance, a horizontal
allocation of territories that accompanied a joint venture could overcome free
riding and ensure optimal promotion of the venture’s product.113
This argument was not an afterthought. It spanned seven and a half pages,
including an analysis of recent cases in which courts, including the Supreme
Court, had rejected claims that territorial and customer restraints should be
107 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 388 U.S.
365 (1967); see Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 404–05, 416–17,
436–37; see also Brief for the United States at 29–51, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967) (No. 25) (contending that Schwinn’s nonprice restraints reduced price com-
petition without producing any offsetting virtues); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 4, at 183–85 (describing Schwinn brief co-authored by Turner and Posner).
108 Oliver E. Williamson, Some Reflections, in FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HIERARCHIES 32, 32
(Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1999) [hereinafter Williamson, Reflections] (“It was my
sense that the prevailing orthodoxies—barriers to entry (Harvard) and price discrimination (Chi-
cago)—dealt with only a fraction of the relevant issues. However, because I did not have an
alternative story, I was unable to dissuade Donald Turner (head of the Antitrust Division) and
Richard Posner (in the Solicitor General’s Office) from arguing the Schwinn case on grounds that
I thought to be mistaken.”).
109 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 431; see also id. at 431–38; cf.
supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (reproducing recognition by Williamson and
Hovenkamp that Telser’s “free riding” account of minimum RPM was a TCE explanation).
110 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 473.
111 Id. at 436 (stating that “[a] market-division agreement employed by a co-operating group
[to prevent free riding] . . . seems precisely analogous to the agreement of partners not to com-
pete with the partnership”).
112 Id. at 430 & n.111 (quoting Telser, supra note 57; Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites
and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (1955)). Telser refers to the
free-riding problem as “free ride.” Telser, supra note 57, at 91. Bowman refers to the same
phenomenon as the “spilling-over effect.” Bowman, supra, at 843.
113 See id. at 432–36.
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unlawful per se.114 Scholars and advocates have cited this article for the pro-
position that market division, for instance, can combat free riding and en-
courage promotion.115
Moreover, after Bork identified several additional efficiencies produced by
territorial and customer restraints, he responded to various counterarguments
to his free-rider analysis, expanding on his articulation of the efficiencies that
these restraints could produce.116 In particular, he responded to the claim—
one that scholars would keep making for decades117—that manufacturers
could achieve the same benefits produced by exclusive territories by, for in-
stance, employing “areas of primary responsibility,” policing dealers’ promo-
tional efforts in assigned territories, and terminating underperforming
dealers.118 Bork’s rebuttal of this less-restrictive-alternative argument, which
modern proponents of the argument have not noticed,119 further clarified his
free-rider argument and elaborated on the transaction cost considerations that
114 Id. at 432–38 (discussing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), Sandura
Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d
403 (5th Cir. 1962), and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,258 (N.D. Ill.
1964)).
115 See Brief for Respondent at 22–23, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
(No. 70-82); Comanor, supra note 33, at 1432–33 (noting, but taking issue with, Bork’s assertion
that territorial and customer restraints prevent free riding); see also Victor P. Goldberg, The Law
and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 129 n.146
(equating Bork’s 1966 view of vertical restraints with the view expressed by Williamson in
1979).
116 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 465–73.
117 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, ]The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22, 36 (1978) (asserting that areas of primary responsibility
are less restrictive alternatives to vertically imposed exclusive territories and “airtight” customer
allocations); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1407 n.142 (2009) (contending that areas of primary responsibility could
achieve the same benefits as exclusive territories imposed ancillary to a joint venture).
118 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 465–69. For an articulation
of this argument that briefly preceded Bork’s article, see Donald F. Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 655, 699 (1962). Indeed, as early as the late 1940s, the Department of Justice had entered
consent decrees forbidding vertical exclusive territories but allowing areas of primary responsi-
bility. See United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,409, at 71,753 (E.D. Pa.
July 13, 1956); supra note 71.
119 See Pitofsky, supra note 117, at 36 (contending that areas of primary responsibility can
achieve the same benefits as exclusive territories, but not mentioning Bork’s counterargument);
Stucke, supra note 117, at 1407 n.142 (same); see also Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing,
Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 101 (1995) (contending that manufacturers who are dissatisfied with the
service provided by their dealers can enter contracts requiring dealers to provide such services,
but not mentioning Bork’s argument that dealers are in a better position to determine appropriate
promotional tactics); Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really “Knaves”?:
The Coming Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, ANTITRUST, Spring 2007, at 61, 65 (same); Robert
Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986)
(contending that areas of primary responsibility can achieve the same benefits as exclusive terri-
tories ancillary to a horizontal joint venture, but not mentioning Bork’s counterargument).
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might give rise to territorial and customer restraints. Bork explained in intri-
cate detail why transaction costs—the costs of bargaining, information, and
enforcement—prevent manufacturers from completely specifying dealers’
contractual obligations.120 Bork explained, for example, that different markets
required different amounts and/or types of promotion, so manufacturers would
find it prohibitively costly to ascertain each dealer’s optimal promotional du-
ties.121 Market division, he said, left independent dealers free to make their
own promotional determinations, without manufacturer oversight, while si-
multaneously giving dealers incentives to make optimal promotional
investments.122
B. THE TRANSACTION COST BASIS FOR BORK’S ARGUMENTS
Bork would subsequently characterize his work as implementing basic
price theory, and he certainly drew on some price-theoretic assumptions.123
However, Bork also articulated and employed assumptions and tools of analy-
sis that were more consistent with TCE than with price theory, beginning with
his analysis of restraints ancillary to partnerships.124 For instance, while price
theory treated the firm as a technologically defined black box, Bork expressly
characterized partnerships as an integrated endeavor between individuals,
consistent with his claim that nearly all business ventures entailed cooperation
that eliminated potential rivalry between individuals.125 After explaining that
120 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 467–69.
121 Id. at 468 (“The manufacturer must, therefore, know what degree of local sales effort is
optimal in each reseller’s territory and must assiduously police each reseller to see that he ex-
pends, against his own interest, the effort desired. This solution is obviously not satisfactory. It
would be extraordinarily costly for the manufacturer to learn at first hand the real sales potential
of every dealer’s area and just how and where each dealer’s sales effort should be expended.”).
122 Id. (explaining that market division solved the problem posed by reliance on atomistic mar-
kets or areas of primary responsibility “by making the reseller’s interest in local sales effort
coextensive with the manufacturer’s interest”).
123 See Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints, supra note 58, at 153–54 (detailing
Bork’s repeated invocation of price theory in The Antitrust Paradox and earlier work); see also
BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 54, at 116 (describing and invoking price theory’s as-
sumptions that firms maximize profits); id. at 107–09 (using price theory’s partial-equilibrium
paradigm to illustrate Bork’s definition of consumer welfare); Bork, Price Fixing and Market
Division II, supra note 3, at 391 n.42 (stating that “[t]he theory of competitive and monopolistic
behavior [described in Bork’s article] is standard and may be found in such texts as STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE”); id. at 425, 471 (invoking assumption that firms behave rationally).
124 See Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints, supra note 58, at 166–70 (explaining how
Bork’s approach reflected TCE reasoning that was inconsistent with price theory).
125 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 380 (“The partnership is
one of the oldest examples in antitrust literature of lawful integration. Partnership is also typi-
cally a horizontal arrangement.”); id. at 377 (asserting that productive business ventures gener-
ally reduce potential rivalry between two or more individuals); see also Peter G. Klein,
Transaction Cost Economics and the New Institutional Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION
TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 27, 28 (Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Klein, New Institutional Economics] (explaining how TCE rests on a “methodologi-
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restraints among partners could enhance the efficiency of a partnership, Bork
contended that the law should treat this partial integration the same way as
complete integration, such as a merger. As Bork put it: “[T]he category of
ancillary agreements is seen to be the same economic phenomenon as the
category of mergers or close-knit combinations. Their difference is merely
one of legal form: the difference between integration accomplished by con-
tract and integration accomplished by ownership.”126
To support this assertion, Bork cited Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature of
the Firm,127 for the proposition that “contract integration” and “ownership in-
tegration” (Bork’s terms for partial integration and complete integration re-
spectively) are economically equivalent methods of achieving the same
objective.128 Moreover, Bork interpreted Coase as having “analyze[d] contract
as being similar to merger [complete integration] in extending the boundaries
of the firm by substituting administrative organization of transactions for mar-
ket organization.”129 In other words, Bork interpreted Coase as arguing that
organization of transactions via partial integration between individuals or oth-
erwise independent entities could perform the same beneficial function as
complete integration—namely, the “administrative organization of transac-
tions.”130 He also interpreted Coase as contending that partial integration, like
complete integration, could “improve on (atomistic) market organization” of
transactions.131 To be sure, other scholars have claimed that Coase’s original
article recognized only the polar opposites of complete integration and atom-
istic transacting.132 However, Coase himself characterized his 1937 article as
recognizing that partial integration could serve the same purpose as complete
integration.133
Bork’s invocation and application of Coase’s 1937 argument reflected the
sort of “contracting orientation” that Williamson would later identify as a cor-
cally individualist outlook,” that is, an approach that treats the individual as the relevant unit of
economic analysis).
126 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 384.
127 Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 1.
128 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 384 n.29; see also id. at 383
n.25 (“As used here, a close-knit combination is a combination by ownership and a loose combi-
nation is one accomplished by agreement of otherwise independent firms.”); id. at 384 (referring
to “the difference between integration accomplished by contract and integration accomplished by
ownership” and characterizing this difference as “merely one of legal form”).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Klein et al., supra note 48, at 326; see also Coase, Meaning, supra note 44, at 27
(reading Klein et al., supra note 48, as arguing that Coase believed that all that existed were
“these polar and clear-cut cases”).
133 See Coase, Meaning, supra note 44, at 27–28; id. at 29–30 (quoting 1930s private corre-
spondence reaching the same conclusion).
2014] ROBERT BORK’S FORGOTTEN ROLE 973
nerstone of TCE.134 That is, Bork treated complete integration and partial inte-
gration as alternative vehicles for achieving beneficial objectives. Through
this treatment, he performed the sort of comparative analysis of competing
contractual forms that Coase first envisioned in 1937135 and that modern TCE
entails.136
Bork’s Coasean equation of complete integration and partial integration
served two different purposes in his analysis. First, this approach informed
Bork’s conclusion that ancillary restraints, though they fall short of complete
integration, could nonetheless produce benefits that could enhance consumer
welfare—benefits that should be cognizable under the Sherman Act.137 Sec-
ond, this approach buttressed Bork’s contention that courts should apply the
same mode of rule-of-reason analysis to ancillary restraints that they apply to
mergers: a market power filter.138
While Coase had contended that partial integration could reduce the cost of
market transactions, he had defined those costs narrowly to include only
search, haggling, monitoring, and enforcement costs.139 These costs differed
little from the sort of technological production costs that were already recog-
nized by neoclassical price theory.140 However, it seemed unlikely that one
134 Williamson, Vertical Integration, supra note 21, at 810; see also Williamson, Natural Pro-
gression, supra note 36, at 678 (“The initial trick was to think contractually, which for many
phenomena was easy but for others required that the phenomenon be reformulated in contracting
terms.”).
135 Coase, Meaning, supra note 44, at 28 (describing his own 1937 work as consistent with the
statement that “the problem of the firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements”).
136 See Peter G. Klein, Vertical Integration, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST
ECONOMICS 165, 166–67 (Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta eds., 2010) (“TCE may be consid-
ered the study of alternative institutions of governance. . . . Simply put, the contractual approach
tries to explain how trading partners choose, from the set of feasible institutional alternatives, the
arrangement that best mitigates the relevant contractual hazards at least cost.”).
137 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 377, 380–84 (constructing a
definition of ancillary restraints that implements a consumer-welfare-based version of the Sher-
man Act).
138 See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (describing Bork’s proposed method for
analyzing ancillary restraints).
139 See, e.g., Coase, Social Cost, supra note 45, at 15 (“[T]o carry out a market transaction it is
necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to
deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract,
to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed,
and so on.”).
140 For example, Frank Knight had described labor as a cost within perfect competition. See
KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 63. Searching for trading partners and bargaining over the terms of an
agreement requires just such labor.
I have argued elsewhere that the similarity between the transaction costs identified by Coase
and ordinary technological production costs helped block recognition of Coase’s revolutionary
insight. See Meese, Reframing Antitrust, supra note 18, at 528–29.
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could explain, say, restraints ancillary to a partnership as efforts to reduce
these costs.141
Instead, Bork identified a different sort of efficiencies that these restraints
might create, efficiencies that Williamson and others would later recognize as
part of the transaction cost paradigm. As noted earlier, both Coase and Wil-
liamson treated complete integration as the paradigm example that theory
should explain; they then generalized that explanation to address partial inte-
gration as well.142 Indeed, Williamson’s earliest work expressly disclaimed
any effort to explain even complete integration into distribution, let alone par-
tial integration in the form of contracts controlling the behavior of otherwise
independent dealers.143
Bork, however, took a different approach, examining directly the possible
efficiency consequences of partial integration without first offering any expla-
nation for complete integration.144 Like Coase in 1937 and Telser six years
before, Bork explained how reliance on an unrestrained market for inputs—
for example, the market for labor in the form of partners’ skill and effort—
could result in a market failure and a concomitant misallocation of re-
sources.145 This nontechnological cost of transacting was qualitatively differ-
ent from the sort of costs that Coase had identified.146 He then explained how
purely private contracting could overcome such a market failure, a task that
economists had previously assigned exclusively to governments.147
Like Telser’s prior argument that minimum RPM could induce appropriate
promotional effort, Bork’s account of nonprice restraints, an extension of his
account of restraints ancillary to a partnership, rested on transaction cost anal-
ysis.148 Bork’s analysis depended on an antecedent determination, resting on
Coase’s 1937 article, that partial integration and complete integration could be
141 See supra notes 89, 103, 104, 139, and accompanying text (describing various restraints that
Bork was addressing).
142 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
143 See Williamson, Market Failure Considerations, supra note 45, at 122.
144 As I have explained elsewhere, Williamson approached the type of questions addressed by
TCE by taking an “inside-out approach,” while Bork, and Lester Telser before him, began
outside the firm and, at least implicitly, worked their way in. See Meese, Non-Standard Con-
tracting, supra note 26, at 51–53.
145 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 449–51.
146 See Meese, Reframing Antitrust, supra note 18, at 492–502 (articulating distinction between
technological and nontechnological transaction costs).
147 See Meese, Non-Standard Contracting, supra note 26, at 54–55 (explaining how, before
1960, economists assumed that only the state could correct market failures); see also PIGOU,
supra note 8, at 175–81 (exemplifying this assumption in 1932 by discussing the potential for
real-property law to address market failures related to tenants’ investments). Indeed, before 1960,
many economists contended that both market failure and perfect competition could co-exist. See
Meese, Non-Standard Contracting, supra note 26, at 56.
148 See supra notes 64, 90–101 and accompanying text.
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alternative means of achieving the same objective. This realization led Bork to
conclude that courts should accord rule-of-reason treatment to partial integra-
tion that met Bork’s ancillarity test.149
Further, Bork expressly recognized that partial integration could result in
the same (optimal) amount of local sales effort that a completely integrated
firm would produce. Indeed, Bork employed the amount of promotion that a
vertically integrated firm would produce as a baseline for comparison to the
amount that independent dealers would produce with, and without, nonprice
restraints.150 Failure to impose nonprice restraints, Bork said, would place a
contractual venture between otherwise independent firms at a competitive dis-
advantage vis-a-vis a fully integrated firm that would internalize the full bene-
fits of its promotional expenditures.151 In short, Bork performed exactly the
sort of comparative analysis of alternative contractual institutions that TCE
calls for: examining the comparative impact of reliance on unfettered markets,
complete integration, and various forms of partial integration (including so-
called less restrictive alternatives) in between.152
In addition, Bork’s analysis invoked several of the market imperfections
emphasized by TCE to buttress his analysis that reliance on an unfettered
market can result in suboptimal promotion and thus a market failure. For in-
stance, Bork’s articulation of the anti-free-riding rationale for various re-
straints expressly assumed the presence of opportunism (without using that
exact term) of the sort not found in ordinary neoclassical models.153 Thus,
when discussing restraints ancillary to a partnership, Bork characterized the
behavior of free-riding partners as “parasitical” conduct that “victimized” fel-
low partners by “appropriating to [the free riders] as individuals the contribu-
tions of other partners.”154 He also characterized free riding by dealers as a
149 See Meese, Non-Standard Contracting, supra note 26, at 52–54 (explaining how Bork and
Telser employed TCE reasoning).
150 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 436 (contending that exclu-
sive territories would eliminate free riding, with the result that “[e]ach is able to engage in the
optimum amount of local sales effort, and the total efforts of the group once more tend to equal
those of a single fully-integrated firm of comparable size”).
151 Id. at 435–36 (“[Free riding] will decrease the amount of local sales effort members of the
group are willing to [produce]. To that extent, the group becomes a less efficient marketer than a
single fully-integrated firm of the same size.”); see also id. at 438 (“[S]ince there is presently no
antitrust objection to the most efficient utilization of local sales effort by ownership-integrated
firms, there seems no reason to discriminate against the accomplishment of the same objective by
contract-integrated systems through the use of market-division agreements.”).
152 See supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text (describing work, by Williamson and
others, characterizing TCE in this manner).
153 See Meese, Reframing Antitrust, supra note 18, at 473 (explaining how price theory as-
sumed away the possibility of opportunism); KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 78 (explaining how the
perfect-competition model’s assumption of perfect information excluded the “preying of individ-
uals upon each other”).
154 Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 382.
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situation in which “one firm in an integrated group is able to take advantage
of the efforts of other members of the group.”155
Moreover, when evaluating and debunking claims that less restrictive alter-
natives such as primary responsibility clauses would serve the same interest
as, for instance, exclusive territories, Bork contended (persuasively) that these
alternatives would entail prohibitive information costs, such as a manufac-
turer’s cost of ascertaining the appropriate type and amount of promotion for
each dealer’s locality.156 Like TCE, this rebuttal rejected price theory’s as-
sumption of perfect information157 and instead recognized that bounded ration-
ality and information costs prevent contracting over every aspect of
commercial relationships.158 Bork’s account introduced the passage of time
into the analysis and assumed that, despite bounded rationality, economic ac-
tors could still anticipate future opportunism and create safeguards to mini-
mize such self-interested activity, another core assumption of TCE.159
155 Id. at 431. Under Williamson’s terminology, dealers who free ride “defect[ ] from the spirit
of cooperation” in favor of the letter of the contract—a contract that, in an atomistic market,
simply mediates the sale of the manufacturer’s product to the dealer without imposing any ac-
companying obligation that the dealer promote the product. Williamson, Natural Progression,
supra note 36, at 677; see also Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 49, at 14
(“The spirit of cooperation . . . [often] gives way to a more calculative orientation as the stakes
increase. The hazard of opportunism—defection from the spirit of cooperation in favor of the
letter of the contract—thus arises.”).
156 See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
157 See KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 77–78 (explaining the role of perfect knowledge in the model
of perfect competition).
In addition, like other practitioners of TCE, Bork rejected price theory’s assumption that each
firm in the marketplace, including dealers, produced identical products. Instead, Bork argued that
varying characteristics of consumers in different markets required each dealer to adopt a different
promotional strategy and thus produce a different product. Compare Bork, RPM, supra note 66,
at 956–57 (contending that promotional expenditures change the nature of the product that con-
sumers purchase, causing that product to include information that dealers otherwise would not
provide), with Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of
Time, in COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
1, 2–3 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) (explaining price theory’s assumption that markets are
characterized by perfect knowledge and “identical” firms, each “transforming homogeneous in-
puts into homogeneous outputs according to given technical ‘blueprints’ known to all”), and
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER
92, 98 (1948) (“The condition where different manufacturers produce the identical product under
identical conditions is in fact the most favorable for producing that state of knowledge among
them which perfect competition requires.”).
158 See Alan J. Meese, Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided and Fu-
tile, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 947–48 (2013) (explaining how Bork’s discussion of less
restrictive alternatives rested on transaction cost considerations); see also WILLIAMSON, ECO-
NOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 187 (contending that less restrictive alternatives often
increase the cost of policing dealer opportunism); Klein, New Institutional Economics, supra
note 125, at 28 (explaining the role of bounded rationality in TCE); Williamson, Natural Pro-
gression, supra note 36, at 677–78 (same).
159 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 435–38 (explaining how
manufacturers, anticipating that reliance on atomistic markets will result in insufficient “local
sales effort,” adopt restraints designed to induce additional promotion); see also WILLIAMSON,
2014] ROBERT BORK’S FORGOTTEN ROLE 977
Bork’s analysis of various restraints also depended on an explicit recogni-
tion that property rights, particularly rights in information, were weak or non-
existent in atomistic markets. As Telser and Kenneth Arrow had done a few
years previously, Bork explained how unconstrained rivalry would prevent
firms from capturing the benefits of information—advertising and promo-
tion—that each might produce.160 In the same way, unconstrained rivalry be-
tween partners and a partnership could prevent the partnership from capturing
the benefits of partners’ various investments in the enterprise.161
Williamson, of course, would later opine that imperfect property rights
could give rise to the sort of opportunism that might motivate parties to create
“convoluted” mechanisms of contractual governance that economists and
others had previously explained as harmful exercises of market power.162 Bork
offered just such an explanation for market division and minimum RPM. He
expressly contended that both types of agreement could create the functional
equivalent of a property right, thereby inducing optimal promotional invest-
ments. Bork’s reasoning, remarkable for the time, is worth quoting in full:
[Minimum] R.p.m., like vertical market division, is the means by which the
manufacturer induces reseller provision of this product [namely, informa-
tion] by making sure that the reseller can recover the product’s cost. The
process is closely analogous to the social recognition of property rights as a
means of inducing economic activities. Contract law delegates to private
persons the power to create property rights because of their superior knowl-
edge of the efficiencies to be gained in particular situations. R.p.m. is best
viewed as an instance of this general principle. The net effect of r.p.m. is to
increase the amount of an existing product (or, more accurately, to enlarge
the information component, for example, of a composite product consisting
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 9 (“Transaction cost economics . . . . maintains
that many economic agents have the capacities both to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards,
and factor these back into the contractual relation, thereafter to devise responsive institutions.”);
cf. Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic
Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1344–51 (2013) (em-
ploying transaction cost analysis to demonstrate how parties might minimize the risk of antici-
pated opportunism through voluntary nonstandard contracts); id. at 1315 n.91 (collecting
authorities documenting how price theory ignored the passage of time).
160 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 430–38; see also Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 614–16 (1962) (detailing how imperfect property rights
in information result in underproduction of information); Telser, supra note 57, at 91–92 (ex-
plaining how some dealers might “get a free ride at the expense of those who have convinced
consumers to buy the product”).
161 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 430–38; see also supra
notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
162 See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 14 n.10 (“Weak prop-
erty rights pose contractual hazards for which ‘convoluted’ forms of organization are sometimes
the cost-effective response.”).
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of a physical item and information about the item) which is offered to
consumers.163
Minimum RPM and vertical market division were examples of what William-
son would later call “inefficiency by design.”164 Ordinarily, of course, manu-
facturers would prefer maximum competition between their dealers, but Bork
used TCE reasoning to show when a rational manufacturer would seek to
restrict this atomistic rivalry to overcome the market failure that would other-
wise result.165
None of this is to say that Bork produced a thorough articulation of TCE,
capable of functioning as a full-fledged operational research program. Bork
did not, for instance, refer to transaction costs by that name or opine that the
transaction should be “the basic unit of analysis,”166 as Williamson would sub-
sequently do. Nor did he expressly identify relationship-specific investments
as the chief independent variable determining the risk of opportunism from
atomistic transacting.167 Finally, while Bork explained in great detail why the
restraints he studied were superior to reliance on atomistic markets or other
forms of partial integration that some offered as less restrictive alternatives, he
devoted little explicit attention to comparing these intermediate or hybrid
modes of organization168 to complete integration. Nonetheless, his critique of
primary-responsibility clauses depended on a recognition that decentralized
promotional decisions by numerous dealers were superior to centralized deter-
minations by a single, completely integrated enterprise.169
These purported shortcomings, however, do not justify understating Bork’s
role in the transaction cost revolution.170 Bork’s work fares no worse than, for
163 Bork, RPM, supra note 66, at 956.
164 WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 14 n.10.
165 Bork applied similar reasoning to other practices. See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion II, supra note 3, at 439–44 (discussing how exclusionary agreements could encourage verti-
cally related joint ventures and related sharing of competitively sensitive information).
166 Williamson, Natural Progression, supra note 36, at 674 (explaining this assumption).
167 Id. at 684 (discussing the role of relationship-specific investments in operationalized TCE).
168 See Williamson, Natural Progression, supra note 36, at 687 (describing TCE’s identifica-
tion of “alternative modes of governance (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) as these relate to differ-
ing adaptive needs, of autonomous and coordinated kinds, among different transactions”).
169 Meese, Intrabrand Restraints, supra note 32, at 580–81 & nn.141, 145; see Bork, Price
Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 436 n.130 (explaining how dealers’ local sales
effort will be more effective than that of upstream manufacturers because dealers “will obviously
be in closer touch with local customers’ desires”); id. at 468–69 (recounting how exclusive terri-
tories  harnessed dealers’ local knowledge about promotional opportunities and were thus supe-
rior to areas of primary responsibility); see also supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text
(further discussing Bork’s critique of primary-responsibility clauses).
170 In his 2009 Nobel lecture, Williamson accurately opined that his own 1971 work “differed
from orthodoxy” in that he:
(1) examined economic organization through the lens of contract rather than the ortho-
dox lens of choice, (2) described cognition in terms of bounded rationality, on which
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example, Telser’s justly famous work on minimum RPM, which Williamson
and others have cited as an early exemplar of TCE.171 Telser’s article did not
mention “vertical integration” or “integration.” The article did not refer to
“transaction costs.” It mentioned “transactions,” but only in the generic sense,
and not to distinguish reliance on the market from complete integration.172 Nor
did Telser mention Coase, whom Bork cited twice. Nor did Telser embrace
Coase’s insight about the essentially contractual nature of all economic activ-
ity or explain that both partial and complete integration could produce the
same (nontechnological) efficiencies.173 Finally, Telser left Bork to provide a
more detailed explanation of why certain alternative contractual arrangements
were, given bounded rationality and bargaining costs, significantly inferior to
market division or minimum RPM.174
Indeed, even Coase himself did not employ the term “transaction costs” in
his 1937 and 1960 works. Moreover, while Williamson employed the term in
1971, he did not expressly refer to the transaction as the unit of analysis,
although this assumption was implicit in his analysis. He instead examined
when reliance on the market resulted in “transactional failure,” a term he em-
ployed once, which he equated with “market failure.”175 “Market failure,” he
said, was present whenever there were “transaction costs that can be attenu-
ated [but not eliminated] by substituting internal organization for market ex-
change.”176 Finally, Williamson did explain how what he called “investment
in special-purpose, long-life equipment” could, in the context of long-term
contracting, “pose adaptive, sequential decision-making problems,” thereby
ensuring that “optimal investment and optimal sequential adaptation processes
account all complex contracts are incomplete, (3) made provision for strategic behav-
ior (defection from the spirit of cooperation) . . . (4) treated adaptation as the main
efficiency purpose of economic organization, and (5) distinguished between invest-
ments in generic assets and specific assets, where a bilateral dependency relation be-
tween supplier and buyer stages was ascribed to the latter.
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, Prize Lecture
(Dec. 8, 2009), www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/williamson
_lecture.pdf. Bork’s 1966–1968 work, likewise, differed from prevailing orthodoxy in the first
four respects.
171 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (collecting assertions by Williamson that
Telser’s 1960 account of minimum RPM rested on TCE logic).
172 See, e.g., Telser, supra note 57, at 103; see also supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text
(recounting Coase’s explanation for the choice between market transactions and the firm as alter-
native ways to conduct economic activity).
173 Cf. supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text (discussing Bork’s citation and discussion
of Coase’s 1937 work).
174 Cf. Telser, supra note 57, at 92–96 (conducting a more cursory analysis of these
alternatives).
175 Williamson, Market Failure Considerations, supra note 45, at 112 (referring to “transac-
tional failures”); id. at 114 (referring to and defining “market failure” in this context).
176 Id. at 114.
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are in conflict.”177 However, he did not give the presence or absence of spe-
cific investments the central role in transaction cost analysis that he would
later assign to it.
Moreover, while Williamson certainly beat Bork to the punch on various
aspects of transaction cost analysis, Bork undeniably won some rounds him-
self. In particular, Bork offered sophisticated explanations for partial integra-
tion, a topic that Williamson intentionally declined to consider in 1971.178
Bork also expressly integrated the conceptual categories of property and con-
tract, explaining how private parties could employ contracts to create the eco-
nomic equivalent of property and thus combat opportunism in a cost-
minimizing way. Neither Williamson nor Telser had made this conceptual
move by 1966. Finally, Bork provided a more detailed account of what he
called “parasitical” conduct (notably free riding), based on an analysis of ac-
tual contracting practices designed to overcome opportunistic behavior, than
Williamson provided in 1971.179
Some may justly wonder why Bork’s contributions to TCE have gone
largely unrecognized. Several considerations may, taken together, provide a
partial explanation.
First, Bork did not claim to be offering a new economic paradigm, unlike
Williamson, who asserted that TCE was a scientific revolution. Instead, Bork
repeatedly characterized his work as an application of basic price theory, the
very economic paradigm that Williamson claimed that TCE overthrew, at
least with respect to the interpretation of nonstandard contracts.180 Thus, while
Williamson and Bork both offered similar interpretations of certain nonstan-
dard agreements, they spoke different languages when doing so. Bork’s lan-
guage, unlike the results of his analysis, did not signal a departure from
orthodox theory.181 Moreover, other members of the Chicago School rein-
forced Bork’s invocation of price theory as the proper basis for analyzing
economic activity.182
177 Id. at 116.
178 See supra note 108 (documenting Williamson’s statement that he had no “alternative story”
for the restraints attacked in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
179 Compare Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 382, with Williamson,
Market Failure Considerations, supra note 45, at 115–17.
180 See supra note 123.
181 It should be noted that Bork was not the only scholar who treated Coase’s work as consis-
tent with price theory. Indeed, Bork apparently found Coase’s 1937 article in a volume entitled
Readings in Price Theory. See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 384
n.29 (citing R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331
(Kenneth E. Boulding & George J. Stigler eds., 1952)).
182 See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 6, at 928 (stating that reliance on price
theory was the distinguishing mark of the Chicago School of antitrust).
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Second, Bork did not persist in his critique of the era’s inhospitable treat-
ment of nonstandard agreements. After his 1968 article on the subject,183 he
did not revisit the question for nearly a decade.
Third, when Bork did return to the topic of nonstandard agreements, he did
not emphasize his own previous transaction cost arguments. For instance, The
Antitrust Paradox did not mention Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, and it
relegated its discussion of the benefits of nonstandard agreements to an ap-
pendix.184 As a result, Bork’s “single monopoly profit” argument loomed
larger than it had in 1966, obscuring Bork’s earlier contribution in modern
eyes.185 During the same period, others repeated the conclusion that exclusive
territories or other restraints could overcome free riding and thus ensure an
optimal amount of promotion, but they emphasized Lester Telser’s contribu-
tions while downplaying Bork’s.186 In short, Bork’s failure to promote his own
work seems partly responsible for the lack of recognition the work has
received.
* * * *
In 1966, Richard Posner, Donald Turner, and others shared an early draft of
their brief in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.187 with Oliver William-
183 Bork, RPM, supra note 66.
184 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 54, at 443–54; see also Robert H. Bork, Verti-
cal Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 171, 181 (reprising the argument that
vertical intrabrand restraints can combat free riding, without mentioning Coase or referring to
economic integration).
185 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (discussing Herbert Hovenkamp’s claim that
Bork’s work barely discusses transaction cost rationales for distribution restraints).
186 For instance, Richard Posner’s 1976 monograph cited Telser’s work for the proposition that
minimum RPM can overcome free riding. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 148 n.22
(1976). He then cited Bork, 12 pages later, for the proposition that “any argument that can be
made on behalf of exclusive territories can also be made on behalf of resale price maintenance.”
Id. at 160 & n.45 (citing Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at 429–64);
see also id. at 151 n.25 (citing Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division II, supra note 3, at
453–64, for the proposition that explanations other than “dealer cartel” and “dealer services”
cannot be ruled out); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Re-
flections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (1977) [hereinafter Posner, Rule
of Reason] (citing Bork a single time for the proposition that nonprice restraints such as those in
Sylvania can overcome free riding); id. at 3–5 (citing or mentioning Telser several times); cf.
Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 53, at 965 (citing inapposite pages of The
Antitrust Paradox for the proposition that vertical market restrictions “ought not be proscribed”).
Posner did not mention Bork’s detailed explanation of how horizontally imposed exclusive terri-
tories that accompanied a joint venture could overcome free riding. See POSNER, supra, at 165
(suggesting, without citing Bork, that these restraints can overcome free riding and thus en-
courage advertising of products sold under a “joint trademark”). But see Goldberg, supra note
115, at 129 n.146 (equating Bork’s 1966 view of vertical restraints with the view expressed by
Williamson in 1979).
187 384 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 388 U.S.
365 (1967).
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son.188 Posner would later claim that the draft reflected the best economic
theory of the time.189 Williamson objected on the grounds that Schwinn’s re-
straints might not be anticompetitive.190 Williamson, however, lacked an “al-
ternative story” to explain the origins of such restraints.191
The very same year, Bork published his masterful Price Fixing and Market
Division II, invoking transaction cost reasoning to explain various forms of
nonstandard contracts, including the contracts before the Court in Schwinn.
That is, he provided the “alternative story” that Williamson did not have.
In a recent tribute, Carl Shapiro opined that Williamson’s rejection of the
government’s position in Schwinn showed that Williamson was ahead of his
time.192 So, it seems, was Robert Bork.
188 See Brief for the United States, Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (No. 25); Williamson, Natural Pro-
gression, supra note 36, at 677.
189 Posner, Rule of Reason, supra note 186, at 3.
190 Williamson, Natural Progression, supra note 36, at 677.
191 Williamson, Reflections, supra note 108, at 32 (admitting the lack of such an alternative
story).
192 See Shapiro, supra note 53, at 143.
